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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN MASS-MARKETED
PRODUCT LITIGATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent Ford Pinto cases' and the advent of asbestos litigation2
have stirred up the controversy over multiple punitive damage awards
against one defendant for injuries arising out of a single mass-marketed
product. While it is commonly accepted that punitive damages may be
awarded in one-on-one torts,3 the merits of multiple awards have often
been debated.4 The specter of multiple claimants suing because of al-
leged wrongful conduct in the design or manufacture of a single prod-
uct5 conjures up obvious problems of management and fairness. An
established authority on strict liability in tort has warned that the prob-
lem of punitive damages in mass-disaster litigation and in products lia-
bility cases with multiple plaintiffs, might well lead to a reexamination
1. E.g., Robert v. Ford Motor Co., 417 N.Y.S.2d 595, 72 A.D.2d 1025, 100 Misc. 2d 646
(1980) (exploding fuel tank in rear-end collision); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19-77-
61 (Orange County Super. Ct., Santa Ana, Feb. 6, 1978) (same). See also 8 PRODUCT
SAFETY & LIABiLrrY REP. 48 (1980) for a discussion of the criminal manslaughter trial
against Ford Motor Company brought in Indiana in early 1980. The court accepted the
argument that the jury should judge the safety of the Pinto's fuel system according to its own
standards, as in a civil products liability case, rather than standards set out by the federal
government sanctions. Documents suppressed at trial included a memorandum in which
Ford compared the cost of changing the Pinto fuel tank design to the value of the lives which
would be lost if the design were not remedied. Such a marketing decision would constitute
evidence of conscious disregard for consumers' safety in a punitive damage claim. See text
accompanying notes 20-25 infra.
2. Eg., Campbell v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 3-78185 (D. Tenn. Dec. 7, 1978); Bar-
nett v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 76-CP-23-1574 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 1978); Bumgardner v.
Johns-Manville Corp., No. 77-995 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 1977); Starnes v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
No. 2-75-122 (D. Tenn. Feb. 17, 1977).
3. See generally Tozer, Punitive Damages and Products Liability, 39 INs. COUNSEL J.
300 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Tozer].
4. Hoenig, Products Liability and Punitive Damages, 47 INS. COUNSEL J. 198 (1980)
(hereinafter cited as Hoenig); DuBois, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury, Products Liabil-
ity and Professional Malpractice Cases: Bonanza or Disaster?, 43 INs. COUNSEL J. 344
(1976); Tozer, supra note 3; Allowance of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Claims, 6
GA. L. REv. 613 (1972).
5. Punitive damages have been sought in product cases based on theories of breach of
implied or express warranty, e.g., Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 306 (1968), strict liability in tort, eg., Pease v. Beech Aircraft Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d 450,
113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974), and fraudulent misrepresentation, eg., Toole v. Richardson-Mer-
rell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
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of the whole basis and policy of awarding punitive damages.6 Another
jurist has remarked that there is "grave difficulty in perceiving how
claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions through-
out the nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill."7
Apart from the possible hardship visited upon a defendant in
mass-marketed product litigation, problems of trial court management
and fairness to litigants may occur where punitive damages are re-
quested. Presently, a plaintiff fortunate enough to litigate against a
manufacturer in a sympathetic jurisdiction might receive a multimil-
lion dollar punitive damage verdict, while another, litigating against
the same manufacturer in a less liberal jurisdiction, might receive noth-
ing or a nominal punitive damage award.8 There is no law regulating
punitive damage claims by successive plaintiffs, although all may be
injured in the same way by the same product. Judge Friendly observed
that "it [does not] seem either fair or practicable to limit punitive recov-
eries to an indeterminate number of first-comers, leaving it to some
unascertained court to cry 'hold-enough' in the hope that others would
follow." 9
The question of fairness has prompted one commentator to sug-
gest a complete abrogation of punitive damages in mass-marketed
product litigation.10 But that suggestion prompts the consumer-minded
to fear that "absent the punitive damages remedy, many manufacturers
may be tempted to maximize profits by marketing products known to
be defective and to absorb resulting injury claims as a cost of doing
business." 1
This comment discusses punitive damages in products liability in
the context of mass-marketed product suits. The arguments for and
against the imposition of multiple punitive damage awards are used to
illustrate the problems and pitfalls of such awards for both plaintiffs
and defendants. Additionally, the difficulties a jury or judge en-
6. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER].
7. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967).
8. This situation occurred in the MER/29 (anti-cholesterol drug) litigation. Although
the plaintiff in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, received no punitive
damages, the plaintiff in Toole, 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967), received
$250,000 after a reduction by the trial court from $500,000.
9. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d at 839-40.
10. Tozer, supra note 3, at 303. Under this view, "fairness forms the basis of the maxim
that where the reason for the rule has ceased to exist," the rule should no longer exist and
thus the several rationalizations for permitting punitive damages no longer exist. d. at 303.
11. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1258,
1291 (1976) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Owen].
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counters in fashioning a second punitive damage award are explored.
Finally, various solutions are offered which present a compromise be-
tween opposing views so that fairness to the defendant manufacturer is
maintained while plaintiffs are allowed satisfaction for their injuries.
II. AN OVERVIEW
A. Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Punitive damages were permitted under the common law as a
means of punishing the defendant for aggravated or outrageous con-
duct, and to deter him and others from similar action in the future.
12
The application of punitive damage theory to civil cases has been criti-
cized as an unwarranted extension of the penal or retributive purpose
of criminal law. 3 Nevertheless, the use of punitive damages in prod-
ucts cases has been deemed a logical extension of the historical need to
deter wrongful conduct, especially where that conduct results in
"foreseeably avoidable and all too often catastrophic injuries from de-
fective products."' 4
From the plaintiffs' viewpoint, punitive damages traditionally op-
erate as a form of individual revenge, deterrence, and punishment.
One practitioner has noted that punitive damages take on a greater im-
port in products litigation as a means to enforce both individual and
community interests. 15 Such damages can serve as a societal curb on
manufacturers' conduct by exposing and punishing misdeeds. The jus-
tification for imposing punitive damages thus becomes similar to the
justification for criminal penalties-retribution and deterrence.16 This
dual goal is further advanced by the tangential effect of eliminating any
unfair profit gained by misconduct in product design and manufac-
ture.' 7
12. The doctrine and theory of punitive damages were given their earliest application in
a 1763 English case. A citizen sued the king's officers for assault, trespass, and false impris-
onment for actions under an illegal warrant. While the plaintiff had been detained merely
six hours, and suffered little physical damage, "exemplary damages" were legitimately
awarded because the illegal warrant was a "most daring public attack made upon the liberty
of the subject." Huckle v. Money, 2 K.B. 206, 207, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (1763).
13. Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 406-07, 179 N.E. 2d 497, 500-01 (1961) (Van
Voorhis, J., dissenting) (fraud and deceit action against publisher).
14. Igoe, Punitive Damages in Products Liabili y, 34 J. Mo. B. 394, 405 (1978).
15. Id. at 395.
16. Tolle v. Interstate Sys. Truck Lines, Inc., 42 MlL App. 3d 771, 772, 356 N.E. 2d 625,
626 (1976) (punitive damages sought against employer for reckless driving by employee).
17. The imposition of punitive damages on manufacturers has been based on the con-
cept that because every business is a profit-maximizer, the most effective means to change
manufacturing behavior is through the pocketbook. One author has suggested that it is
19811
LOYOL4 OF LOS .NGELES LAW REVIEW [
Punitive damages serve a further social function by increasing
public safety through a coercive remedial effect on product design.'
8
This purpose of punitive damages will be effective to the extent that the
manufacturer's conscience is affected, or to the extent that the company
seeks to avoid the stigma and severity of punishment. 19
B. Imposing Punitive Damage Awards Proof and Policy
Punitive damages are awarded only when the defendant's behav-
ior amounts to intentional or malicious wrongdoing or where the de-
fendant manifests a reckless or conscious disregard for the safety of
others, such that the defendant's conduct could almost be characterized
as criminal.2" In California, the defendant's act must be wrongful, not
only in the sense of causing injury, but also in the sense that it was done
purposely, or in conscious disregard of the rights of others.2 ' Califor-
nia has codified these specific categories of misconduct; where the de-
fendant is shown guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or
unrealistic to assume that the financial impact of lawsuits will affect manufacturing deci-
sions. Christopher Stone, in an analysis of corporate social responsibility and behavior,
found that "to the executive and business community peer group, having profits cut into by a
lawsuit simply does not involve the same loss of face as losses attributable to other causes."
C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 40 (1975) [hereinafter cited as STONE]. Stone discovered
that "businessmen questioned about product liability suits believe 'it could happen to any-
one,' and that 'lawsuits against a pharmaceutical house were likened to being struck by
lightning."' Major lawsuit losses are "explained on corporate financial reports as 'non-re-
curring losses.'" Id.
18. See, ag, Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 M11. App. 2d 109, 132, 253 N.E.2d 636, 646
(1969) (evidence of different cap designs used after accident admissible). See text accompa-
nying note 45 infra for facts of case. See also Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal.
App. 2d 589, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
19. In Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497 (1961), the New York Court of
Appeals held that a publisher who had defrauded the general public into contracts was
liable for punitive damages. Judge Fuld, writing for the majority, noted that companies "are
very much more likely to pause and consider the consequences if they have to pay more than
the actual loss suffered by an individual plaintiff. An occasional award of compensatory
damages against such parties would have little deterrent effect." Id. at 406, 179 N.E.2d at
499.
20. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 9-10 (defining the requisite conduct for punitive damages;
the defendant's wrongdoing has the character of outrage frequently associated with crime).
21. Recent California law has affirmed this view. In permitting the recovery of punitive
damages in drunk driving cases, the California Supreme Court quoted Prosser as saying,
"[s]omething more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive dam-
ages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or 'malice'...
or such a conscious and deliberate disregard ofthe interests of others that [one's] conduct may
be called wilfil or wanton." Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 894-95, 598 P.2d 856,
856, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 696 (1979) (emphasis in original) (quoting W. PROSSER, THE LAW
OF ToRTs § 2 (4th ed. 1971)).
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implied, the plaintiff may recover punitive damages.22 Maliciousness is
generally understood as behavior with evil intentions. In a noninten-
tional tort case, a plaintiff may have a difficult battle proving not only
that the defendant intended to injure, but also that he appreciated the
likelihood of injury and therefore acted with evil motive.
In other jurisdictions, conduct proven willful, wanton, or reckless
is sufficient for an award of punitive damages.23 A wanton act is per-
ceived as a wrongful act done on purpose or with malicious disregard
for the rights of others. Recklessness has been defined as an indiffer-
ence to the rights of others, whether or not wrong or injury occurs.24
In products liability litigation where punitive damages have been
awarded, juries have determined that manufacturers resorted to such
socially reprehensible conduct as fraud, gross negligence, and conscious
disregard for the safety of consumers in the marketing of products.
25
To maintain the quasi-criminal effect of punitive damages, a punitive
damage award should correspond to the degree that a manufacturer is
aware of the safety risk inherent in the product. It has been suggested
that the more certain a manufacturer is that his product poses a risk
and the more dangerous that risk is, the more serious is his misconduct
and therefore the more severe his punishment should be.
26
C. Opposing Punitive Damage Awards: Theory and Policy
Defendants have opposed the application of punitive damages in
products liability litigation27 on the theory that strict liability and puni-
22. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1981). Malice under California Civil Code
§ 3294, as interpreted by an appellate court, "implies an act conceived in a spirit of mischief,
or with a criminal indifference towards the obligations owed to others." Ebaugh v. Rabkin,
22 Cal. App. 3d 891, 894, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706, 708 (1972). Oppression under the statute has
been defined as "[a]n act of subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious
disregard of that person's rights." Roth v. Shell Oil Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 676, 681, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 514, 517 (1960).
23. See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 123(1) (1966) and cases cited therein.
24. Evans v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 289 Mo. 493, 503, 233 S.W. 397, 400 (1921) (speeding
railroad train; conduct not sufficiently reckless to justify imposition of punitive damages).
25. E.g., G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218
(1975) (conscious disregard of safety of others held sufficient to show malice); Toole v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967) (malice and fraud
found).
26. See, eg., Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 928,582 P.2d 980, 984, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 389, 398 (1978) (punitive damages awarded for insurance company's bad faith failure
to pay uninsured motorist claim).
27. One jurisdiction, taking up the defendant's cause, advocated abolishing punitive
damages in civil cases altogether. That court stated that "punitive damages are given, not to
compensate the plaintiff for his injury, but to punish and deter the tortfeasor. . . . Wilful
and intentional torts, of course, still exist, but should not be confused with negligence. ...
1981]
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tive damages are inherently incompatible.28 A strict products liability
case purportedly "looks to a defect in the product, rather than any cul-
pable act by the manufacturer,"2 9 while the punitive damage case fo-
cuses on the manufacturer's conduct.3 0 A defendant sued on a strict
liability theory for compensatory damages in a products case could ar-
gue that the plaintiff must at least make a further showing of aggra-
vated conduct on the defendant's part to justify punitive damages.3'
Further, defendants have historically made constitutional objec-
tions to the imposition of punitive damages on due process 32 and
double jeopardy33 grounds.
Punitive damages may arguably be unjust to defendants in prod-
ucts liability cases involving mass-produced goods. The cumulative
amount of punitive damages awarded against a single manufacturer in
such cases may overwhelm the defendant financially. Thus, "consider-
ations of fundamental, ordinary fairness" should operate to limit
awards 34 where a design defect affecting an entire product lot yields up
multiple plaintiffs, each entitled to punish the manufacturer.
III. LITIGATING MULTIPLE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
The proof and policy concepts outlined above may be utilized dif-
ferently by a second or third plaintiff suing a single manufacturer for
injuries, caused by a mass-marketed product, which are similar to those
suffered by the first plaintiff. The successive plaintiffs will bear the
same burden of proof as the first plaintiff in such cases, but may have to
alter traditional policy arguments. The defense in such suits will have
difficulty assessing the compensatory damage phase and predicting the
The protection of the public from such conduct or from reckless, wanton or wilful conduct is
best served by the criminal laws of the state." Bielski v. Schulze, 26 Wis. 2d 1, 18, 114 N.W.
2d 105, 113 (1962).
28. Contra, Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 719, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 419
(punitive damages allowed in drug (MER/29) case where defendant's misconduct justified
the award); Owen, supra note 11, at 1269 (strict liability "has never purported to delimit the
remedies that might be appropriate if a plaintiffs accident is attributable to some aggravated
fault of the manufacturer").
29. Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 91 S.D. 300, 310 n.7, 249 N.W. 2d 251, 257 n.7 (1976)
(homeowner's product liability suit successful against manufacturer of furnace safety shut-
off valve which malfunctioned and caused fire).
30. See note 25 supra.
31. Drake v. Wham-O Mfg. Co., 373 F. Supp. 608, 611 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (punitive dam-
ages permitted in recreational product case where the plaintiff made showing of manufac-
turer's aggravated conduct).
32. See notes 80-87 infra and accompanying text.
33. See notes 88-100 infra and accompanying text.
34. Tozer, supra note 3, at 301.
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potential punitive damage verdict even if punitive damages were
awarded in the previous suit.
A. The Plaintirs Arguments
Before a case for punitive damages in products liability may go
forward, the plaintiff must show actual damages.35 Moreover, even as-
suming that a second litigant has proven actual damages, he, like any
claimant for punitive damages, bears the burden of proof as to why the
defendant's conduct warrants special punishment.36
Differing standards of proof as to the requisite conduct warranting
the imposition of punitive damages may preclude an award in some
cases. Plaintiffs suing defendants with nationwide marketing concerns
may be subject to the vagaries of state law on what constitutes suffi-
ciently reprehensible manufacturing behavior.37 Litigation on opposite
coasts in the MER/29 cases produced opposite results on the issue of
punitive damages. In New York, in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., the three-judge appellate panel determined that the "evidence
was not sufficient to warrant submission of the punitive damage issue
to the jury. ' 38 In California, the same evidence of falsified research
and test data along with misrepresentations to the FDA was intro-
duced. The California appellate court "respectfully differ[ed]" from
the Roginsky holding, finding in its record "ample evidence of conduct
on the part of [the manufacturer] from which the jury could infer inten-
tional, wilful and reckless conduct on [the defendant's] part, done in
35. Esparza v. Specht, 55 Cal. App. 3d 1, 127 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1976) (sufficiently proven
legally compensable damages justifies issue of punitive damages to be sent to jury, even
when offset award eliminates actual damage recovery); James v. Public Fin. Corp., 47 Cal.
App. 3d 995, 121 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1975) (compensatory verdict of $0 and punitive damage
verdict of $1,750 remanded for entry of judgment in amount of $1,750 as actual and puni-
tive); Bezaire v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 12 Cal. App. 3d 888, 91 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1970)
(no punitive damages allowed where no actual damage suffered).
36. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d at 715-16, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
See text accompanying notes 20-25 supra.
37. In the suits arising from the 1979 DC-10 crash in Chicago, McDonnell-Douglas was
subject to the laws of several states concerning punitive damages. About one-half of these
states permitted punitive damages in wrongful death cases. The question became one of
choice of law, subject to the rule of which state bore the greatest interest in the allegedly
egregious conduct. On the issue of punitive damages, the choice was between the place of
the conduct and the place of the defendant's domicile. One court found that the place of the
accident was fortuitous, and held that the place of the defendant's domicile was the proper
place to litigate the issue of punitive damages. That state was Missouri, in which McDon-
nell-Douglas could be held liable for punitive damages in wrongful death cases. N.Y.L.J.,
June 20, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
38. 378 F.2d at 835.
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disregard of possible injury to persons. '39
In a products case seeking punitive damages, the second plaintiff,
like the first, should show not only deception, but also the defendant's
knowledge that injuries were substantially certain to result from the use
of the product.' In a case involving injuries arising from the same
aircraft, plaintiffs introduced evidence that the aircraft manufacturer
had long been aware of an alleged design defect in the fuel tank, but
had failed to notify aircraft purchasers and continued to certify the air-
craft as crash-worthy.4 1 Proof of prior knowledge of a defect and a
concomitant failure to rectify were sufficient to impose punitive dam-
ages in Rinker v. FordMotor Co. 42 There, Ford had twenty-nine prior
reports of a defective throttle in a carburetor, but issued no warnings to
dealers or customers.43 Elsewhere, punitive damages were permitted
twice against the same drug manufacturer where it fraudulently and
deceitfully misrepresented the safety of its products. Corporate execu-
tives knew of falsified data and injurious side effects, but continued to
actively promote the sale of the product despite such knowledge.44 The
Drano manufacturer's knowledge of its product's potential dangerous-
ness (that caustic soda compound was damaging to human tissue),
along with prior notice of spontaneous explosions (the caustic soda
compound generated gas in cans), was sufficient proof of gross disre-
gard for consumers' safety. Punitive damages were imposed where evi-
dence revealed that Drano failed to warn users of the product's
dangers, while its own bottlers were instructed to wear cotton clothing
and goggles.4'
39. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d at 715 n.3, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416
n.3. The New York standard for punitive damages holds that the recklessness that will give
rise to punitive damages must be close to criminality. 14 N.Y. JURISPRUDENCE, Damages
§ 181 (1969). This is apparently stricter than California's malice, fraud, or oppression stan-
dard under CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1981).
40. G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d at 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 225 (in
products liability suit seeking punitive damages plaintiff should charge the defendant manu-
facturer with knowledge of the dangerous potential of its product).
41. Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 464-65, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 425-
26 (1974) (punitive damages not recoverable in a wrongful death action arising out of air-
craft crash).
42. 567 S.W.2d 655, 667-68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
43. Id. at 667.
44. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967);
Ostopowitz v. Richardson-Merrell, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1967, at 20, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Westches-
ter County).
45. Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 IM. App. 2d at 136-37, 253 N.E.2d at 649.
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1. Use of collateral estoppel
The doctrine of collateral estoppel may aid a second plaintiff's
burden of proof on the issue of a manufacturer's reprehensible conduct.
The principles of collateral estoppel, whereby a conclusive previous
judgment is asserted in a subsequent action to bar relitigation of identi-
cal issues although theories of recovery may differ,46 should logically
pertain to successive punitive damage claims. The applicability of col-
lateral estoppel appears compelling especially where the issue of the
product's defectiveness overlaps the issue of fraud, malice, or conscious
disregard for the safety of others,47 assuming that similar standards for
the imposition of punitive damages apply.
It should be noted that estoppel resulting from a judgment is
equally available to either the plaintiff or the defendant in a subsequent
action .4  Traditionally, estoppel had to be mutual. That is, the judg-
ment in the original action had to bind both litigants before one party
could subsequently assert that the other was estopped by the prior
judgment.49 Thus, a plaintiff could not assert collateral estoppel in a
subsequent action involving the same issue against the same defendant
unless the plaintiff was also a party to the first suit. California has
abolished the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel.50 The current rule is
46. 46 AM. JUR. 2d Judgments § 521 (1969); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1044 (1970).
47. Cf. Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836, 840-41 (E.D. Tex. 1980)
(doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the manufacturers of asbestos from contesting the
issue of whether products containing asbestos were unreasonably dangerous).
48. It has been argued by general counsel for Richardson-Merrell that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel should operate as a defense in mass-marketed product litigation involving
punitive damages. The same issues and evidence will be presented regarding punitive dam-
ages and each plaintiff is theoretically "seeking to deter the future acts of the defendant for
the good of the public." Thus, "plaintiffs are in privy with one another so that a judgment
rendered by [one] court. . . on the merits. . . on. . . punitive damages in one of such
cases, will be a bar to such court in any other action in any other court so long as the prior
judgment remains unreversed.... ." Silliman, Punitive Damages Relatedto Multile Litiga-
ton Against a Corporation, FED. OF INS. COUNSEL Q., Spring, 1966, 91, 95. This argument
was summarily rejected, however, in Roginsky, where Judge Friendly stated, "We know of
no principle whereby the first punitive award exhausts all claims for punitive damages and
would thus preclude further judgments." 378 F.2d at 839 [footnote omitted]. However, such
a determination does not necessarily prevent plaintiffs from invoking the doctrine.
49. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942) provides that a "person who is not a
party or privy to a party to an action in which a valid judgment other than a judgment in
rem is rendered. . . is not bound by or entitled to claim the benefits of an adjudication
upon any matter decided in the action."
50. Reasons for abolishing the rule of mutuality in favor of asserting collateral estoppel
only against the party bound by a prior judgment have included the fact that the party
against whom the plea is raised was a party to the prior action, that he had full opportunity
to litigate the issue of his responsibility, and that there is no reason for permitting him to
relitigate that issue. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Foundation, 402
1981]
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that one not a party to a judgment nor in privity with such party may
assert collateral estoppel against one who is bound by the previous
judgment. Thus, the second party, while not a litigant in the first suit,
can prevent the relitigation of an issue determined in the prior action.5'
To invoke collateral estoppel, the plaintiff in a successive suit
against a single manufacturer must establish that the same issue that
was necessary to the judgment in the prior action is decisive of the pres-
ent action and that there was a full and fair opportunity for the party
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted to have contested the deci-
sion now said to be controlling.5 2 Evidence of prior similar product
accidents could provide support for the use of collateral estoppel in the
punitive damage phase of mass-marketed product suits. In Moore v.
Jewel Tea Co., evidence of previous similar explosions of an unopened
drain cleaning product was admissible and competent, not for the pur-
pose of showing independent acts of negligence, but to establish that
the common cause of the accidents was a dangerous and unsafe prod-
uct.53 Thus, with respect to the punitive damage case, a plaintiff seek-
ing to prevent relitigation of the defendant's conscious disregard of
safety might argue that previous evidence which conclusively estab-
lished the dangerousness of a product now estops the defendant from
asserting that it had no knowledge of the product's dangerous propensi-
ties.
Collateral estoppel has often been used successfully by different
plaintiffs in substantially similar actions against the same air carrier for
U.S. 313 (1971) (a patent infringement case not within the present scope). Courts have been
mixed as to whether collateral estoppel may be asserted offensively, that is, whether a plain-
tiff not a party to previous suits may collaterally estop litigating the issue of negligence if
that issue has been decided adversely to the defendant in previous suits. Kelly v. Trans
Globe Travel Bureau, Inc., 60 Cal. App. 3d 195, 202, 131 Cal. Rptr. 488, 492-93 (1976) (no
collateral estoppel effect given in personal injury civil suits to "course and scope" of employ-
ment determined in previous workers' compensation proceeding); Cochran v. Union Lum-
ber Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 423, 427-28, 102 Cal. Rptr. 632, 635-36 (1972) (title deed language
construction; collateral estoppel could not be asserted by stranger grantee to defeat defend-
ant's claims); McDougall v. Palo Alto Unified School Dist., 212 Cal. App. 2d 422, 428-31, 28
Cal. Rptr. 37,40-42 (1963) (quiet title action; collateral estoppel may only be asserted defen-
sively). But Sf Louie Queriolo Trucking, Inc. v. Superior Court, 252 Cal. App. 2d 194, 200,
60 Cal. Rptr. 389, 392-93 (1967) (determination of negligence in previous suit could be as-
serted by plaintiff in subsequent suit).
51. Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir.), cer. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950);
Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
52. Schwartz v. Public Adm., 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 728 (1969) (passenger's
judgment against operators of colliding vehicles collaterally estopped operators from reliti-
gating the issue of their negligence in subsequent action by one driver for his own injuries).
53. 116 I11. App. 2d 109, 129, 253 N.E.2d 636, 645 (1969).
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injuries arising out of a single accident. 4 Plaintiffs claiming collateral
estoppel in defective mass-marketed product litigation may not be so
fortunate. The defense in the recent California asbestos litigation 55 re-
sisted the application of collateral estoppel on the grounds that incon-
sistent verdicts prevented the fair application of the doctrine.5 6
In Williams v. Laurence-David, Inc. ," collateral estoppel was not
allowed by the Oregon Supreme Court in a second suit against a manu-
facturer of rubber gloves which allegedly caused contact dermititis. Al-
though the previous party-plaintiff had worn rubber gloves bearing the
same brand insignia as those worn by the present plaintiff, the court
held collateral estoppel to be inapplicable as there was no evidence that
the gloves worn by the previous litigant were identical with those worn
by the present plaintiff, or that they came from the same carton or case
lot.58
Successive plaintiffs in products cases seeking to invoke collateral
estoppel only on the issue of punitive damages may be able to distin-
guish the above cases. First, in the recent asbestos suit and in William
54. Injured plaintiffs or estates of plaintiffs have affirmatively used collateral estoppel
against defendant air carriers on the issue of negligence or other liability. United Air Lines,
Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Gliedman v.
Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298 (D.C. Md. 1967); United States v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (D.C. Nev. 1962).
55. Memorandum of Points and Authorities for Defendant, Beauregard v. Johns-
Manville, No. C137466 (L.A. Super. Ct. June 1980) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum]. It
was thought that the plaintiff would move to collaterally estop the defendant from denying
knowledge of dangers caused by inhalation of asbestos dust by asbestos insulation workers
but the issue of collateral estoppel was not litigated.
56. Id. As authority for this position, the defendant relied on State Farm & Cas. Co. v.
Century Home Components, Inc., 275 Or. 97, 550 P.2d 1185 (1976), a property damage case
in which the Oregon Supreme Court determined that "[t]here seems to be something funda-
mentally offensive about depriving a party of the opportunity to litigate the issue again when
he has shown beyond a doubt that on another day he prevailed." Id. at 110, 550 P.2d at
1191 (footnote omitted). The unfairness concept stems from a plaintifts selective applica-
tion of collateral estoppel from among inconsistent verdicts. The defense in Beauregard v.
Johns-Manville relied on the United States Supreme Court determination in Parklane Ho-
siery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), that "[a]llowing offensive collateral estoppel is itself
inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in favor of the defendant." Id. at 330,
quoted in Memorandum, supra note 55.
57. 271 Or. 712, 534 P.2d 173 (1975).
58. In the court's view:
[We must recognize one individual might have an adverse reaction whereas an-r individual might not. This isn't like a situation where you have an automo-
bile accident. There is one set of facts that creates the damage and the injury.
Obviously these two people weren't wearing the same pair of gloves at the
same time and maybe not under the same conditions. At least conceivably there
may well be and probably are different factors involved which would give rise to
different reactions ....
Id. at 724 n.l, 534 P.2d at 178 n.1 (quoting observations of trial court judge).
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v. Laurence-David, Inc., the operation of collateral estoppel was denied
only in the compensatory damage phase of the case.5 9 Second, the fact
that different reactions may result from the use of a product, or that a
product may be used under different conditions, should prove unper-
suasive in light of other mass-marketed product litigation. In the
MER/29 cases, the only successive plaintiff products cases completely
litigated, punitive damages were awarded although evidence showed
that some, but not all, product users developed either cataracts, bald-
ing, or skin irritation, and obviously not all users were on the same
dosage regimen.60 Further, differences in the severity of injuries suf-
fered by plaintiffs might not prevent the operation of collateral estoppel
on the issue of punitive damages.61 In Robert v. Ford Motor Co. ,62 the
plaintiff's parents died when the fuel tank of their Pinto ruptured in a
rear-end collision. The court held that punitive damages could be al-
lowed in wrongful death cases as well as those where victims survived.
Thus, the fact that in some suits the consumers died, while in others
they were merely injured, should not prevent collateral estoppel on the
issue of manufacturing misconduct. Finally, the distinction drawn by
the court in Williams v. Laurence-David, Inc. ,63 between injuries occur-
ring from various lots of a product seems largely irrelevant in the puni-
tive damage phase of a case. Presumably a manufacturer has engaged
in the same conduct with respect to all lots of a product-at least until
litigation brings such misconduct to a halt. Thus, the doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel may prove a boon to plaintiffs seeking punitive damages
in mass-marketed product suits. The doctrine can clearly ease the
plaintiffs' burden of proof, especially when amassing evidence of the
defendant's conscious disregard of safety proves costly and time-con-
suming.
59. 271 Or. 712, 534 P.2d 173 (1975). The use of collateral estoppel in the liability phase
of products litigation was also recently discussed in Weisiger, Collateral Estoppel and the
Mass-Produced Product: A4 Proposal, 15 NEw ENGLAND L. REV. 1 (1980).
60. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d at 699, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
61. Collateral estoppel was not invoked by plaintiffs in the reported cases on MER/29,
as they were decided within a few months of each other. See note 44 supra.
62. 100 Misc. at 646, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 595 (plaintiff-heir must prove "maliciousness,
wantonness, wilfulness, and depraved indifference in defendant's manufacturing the car
with knowledge of the fuel tank defect"). But California does not permit punitive damages
to be awarded to heirs in wrongful death cases. Stencel Aero. Eng'r. Corp. v. Superior
Court, 56 Cal. App. 3d 978, 128 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1976); Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal.
App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974).
63. 271 Or. 712, 534 P.2d 173 (1975).
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2. Policy arguments of successive plaintiffs.
A plaintiff arguing for punitive damages usually urges that there is
a need to punish and deter the defendant's misconduct. In the case of a
first litigant suing a single manufacturer in a mass-marketed product
suit, such traditional arguments will probably suffice. In the event a
punitive damage verdict obtains in the first lawsuit, however, the con-
ventional punish and deter arguments may be less persuasive in the
second suit, even though the availability of punitive damages may en-
tice successive plaintiffs to litigate.
A products liability claim can be expensive and a compensatory
award may not cover the costs of suit.' 4 A subsequent plaintiff asking
that punitive damages be awarded against the defendant manufacturer
might argue for an exemplary award in at least the amount of his litiga-
tion expenses. A plaintiff whose compensatory award cannot cover his
attorney's fees must by necessity pay his attorney out of his punitive
damage award. A small minority of jurisdictions allow punitive dam-
ages only in the amount of costs of suit; punitive damages are awarded
not to punish the defendant for his misconduct, but as additional com-
pensation to the plaintiff for his counsel's fees and disbursements.65
Under this system, even the last claimant in mass-marketed product
litigation would be encouraged to litigate his case.66
64. Generally, it is improper to include attorneys' fees as part of exemplary damages.
Viner v. Untrecht, 26 Cal. 2d 261, 273, 158 P.2d 3, 9 (1945). However, in the absence of any
agreement between the client and his attorney, the attorney is entitled to be repaid for costs
of suit, such as filing fees, witness fees, and jury fees. Cooley v. Miller & Lux, 156 Cal. 510,
525, 105 P. 981, 987 (1909). In actions for damages in personal injury suits, contingent fee
contracts are common, whereby the attorney agrees to take his compensation in the form of
a stated proportion of the amount recovered, if there is any recovery. Compensation in a
contingent fee arrangement is generally one third the net amount of distribution to the
plaintiff, plus reimbursement for advances of court costs. Hendricks v. Sefton, 180 Cal. App.
2d 526, 532, 4 Cal. Rptr. 218, 221 (1960); Eaton v. Thieme, 15 Cal. App. 2d 458, 461-62
(1936). It is evident that the contingent fee compensation is calculated on the entire distribu-
tion to the plaintiff thus, attorneys' fees are paid out of a punitive damage award as well as
out of compensatory awards in contingent fee situations.
65. Eg., Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 578, 150 A. 692, 693 (1930). California
does not limit punitive damage awards to the amount of attorneys' fees expended. But Cali-
fornia jurists have recognized that other jurisdictions limit punitive damages as compensa-
tory only. Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 906 n.4, 598 P.2d 854, 863 n.4, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 693, 703 n.4 (1979).
66. Some commentators have suggested that a punitive damage award should compen-
sate for the amount of effort exerted by a litigant to establish and prove the misconduct of a
defendant manufacturer. This theory recognizes that the initial plaintiff may expend enor-
mous effort to document his punitive damage case, while subsequent plaintiffs may often
take advantage of such initiative and "ride to favorable verdicts and settlements on the coat-
tails of the first comers." Owen, supra note 11, at 1325. However, the award-reduction
system appears problematic in several respects. First, a subsequent plaintiff relying on col-
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A punitive damage award also operates to punish the defendant
for the misconduct that endangered society.67 A plaintiff might argue
the need to remind the manufacturer that the public continues to disap-
prove of a flagrant disregard of the consumers' safety. A second puni-
tive verdict might also affirm the validity of any previous awards.
The need for personal satisfaction may remain the subsequent
plaintiff's most persuasive argument to the trier of fact for imposing a
second punitive award against a single manufacturer. Such an award
clearly functions as the litigant's private revenge, as well as compensa-
tion for losses he is unable to prove, or for which the law does not
ordinarily provide recovery.6"
B The Defendant's Arguments
A defendant manufacturer may oppose successive claims for puni-
tive damages under a variety of theories. These include arguments that
the manufacturer's conduct does not warrant a second award, or that
the plaintiff has been sufficiently compensated by his actual damage
award. Defendant manufacturers may also claim constitutional protec-
tions under the due process, double jeopardy, and commerce clauses,
and may assert that multiple awards constitute cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. Further, defendants may contend that such awards precipi-
tate bankruptcy.
1. The defendant's policy arguments
Defendant manufacturers often argue against the assessment of
successive awards on the premise that where a single wrongful act re-
sults in injury to many persons, successive punitive damage awards are
illogical. Thus, while defendants may concede that punitive damages
might be imposed on the ground of deterring future misconduct, they
might argue it is unreasonable to assume that successive punitive dam-
age awards will effect any greater deterrence than the first such award.
lateral estoppel to establish the manufacturer's misconduct in his own case would have his
punitive damage award substantially reduced because he would not be required to docu-
ment his punitive damage case as fully as did the first. Thus, by inhibiting the possible
invocation of collateral estoppel, the award-reduction system precludes the use of an effec-
tive tool to speed up litigation. Second, the award-reduction system interjects a cost-benefit
decision in the midst of the traditional evidentiary determination with regard to punitive
damages. It is questionable whether the jury, which usually determines if the evidence
presented warrants a punitive award, is qualified to judge the quality as well as the quantity
of a particular plaintifs evidence, as the award-reduction system seems to require.
67. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
68. See note 64 supra.
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Jurists have doubted the effectiveness of punitive damages in suits
against business enterprises.69 Judge Friendly in Roginsky recognized
that it may prove impossible to impose a ceiling on punitive damage
awards in hundreds of suits in different courts and that the result will
be an aggregate of damages proving "catastrophic" to the defendant.7"
Neither courts nor defendants have adopted Judge Friendly's criti-
cism of multiple punitive damage awards. One court has stated that "it
would require a substantial change in the law to hold that simply be-
cause there might be other suits filed against a defendant, punitive
damages should not be allowed."71 In Grimshaw v. Ford, Ford ap-
pealed the punitive damage verdict on the basis of excessiveness due to
passion and prejudice on the part of the jury, rather than arguing the
appropriateness of punitive damages.72 In Toole v. Richardson-Merrell
Inc., the court stated that California Civil Code section 3294 estab-
lishes a right to punitive damages without discussing the difficulties cre-
ated by multiple punitive awards.7 3
A defendant subject to many punitive damage verdicts arising out
of a mass-marketed product may argue that compensatory awards in a
significant number of suits are sufficient punishment.7 4 Many large ac-
tual damage awards plus the costs of suit, including legal fees, along
with the interruption in business, may drive the deterrence message
home as effectively as any award labelled "punitive." The Roginsky
court recognized this fact in the context of drug manufacturers, stating
that "a manufacturer distributing a drug to many thousands of users
under government regulation scarcely requires this additional measure
[punitive damages] for manifesting social disapproval and assuring de-
terrence. Criminal penalties and heavy compensatory damages recov-
69. See, e.g., Mattyatovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 MlL 2d 320, 326, 330 N.E.2d 509,
512 (1975) (punitive damages were not awarded against bus company for alleged willful and
wanton conduct of its driver which caused death of passenger).
70. Rogninsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d at 841.
71. Vollert v. Summa Corp., 289 F. Supp. 1218, 1351 (D. Hawaii 1975) (products liabil-
ity action by passenger injured in helicopter crash against designer and manufacturer of
helicopter).
72. Grimshaw v. Ford, No. 19-77-61 (Orange County Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 1978).
73. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 713, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
74. This argument has been made in punitive damage claims outside of products liabil-
ity. Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d at 902,598 P.2d at 860, 157 CaL Rptr. at 700 (1979)
(Clark, J., dissenting) (drunk-driving case alleging punitive damages). Contra, Wangen v.
Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Wis. 1980) (intersection collision in which a 1967
Ford Mustang was rear-ended and fuel tank ruptured; court stated that multiple claims for
compensatory damages are not a sufficient deterrent for the wrong-doer who might find it
more economically advantageous to set aside funds for payment of claims than to cease
misconduct).
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erable under some circumstances even without proof of negligence
should sufficiently meet these objectives .. ."7 Of course, the success
of an argument that many compensatory verdicts, in and of themselves,
sufficiently deter manufacturing misconduct depends upon whether ev-
idence of these other verdicts would be admissible.76
A punitive damage award must be absorbed by the manufacturer
as a cost of doing business, and paid out of profits or retained earn-
ings.7 7 When a manufacturer must pay numerous punitive damage
verdicts, consumers at large may eventually bear the brunt of such
awards in the form of higher prices. Thus, the claim that compensatory
awards amply punish the manufacturer may appeal to a consumerist




Due process and double jeopardy arguments have been rejected in
products liability cases where punitive damages have been assessed.79
Yet these constitutional protections, and others such as the cruel and
unusual punishment doctrine and the commerce clause, appear appli-
cable in the event of multiple punitive damage awards.
A single manufacturer faced with many punitive damage awards
might argue that a statute such as California Civil Code section 3294
authorizing punitive damages"0 is unconstitutionally vague8 l for its
75. 378 F.2d at 840-41.
76. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d at 459-60 (jury permitted to consider com-
pensatory and punitive damages in other cases involving injuries arising out of the same or
similar product where evidence of defendant's wealth was admissible).
77. Insurance is not available for punitive damages as a matter of public policy. CAL.
INs. CODE § 533 (Deering 1974); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (Deering 1971); Gray v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263,415 P.2d 168,54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966). See generally Insurance Coverage
of 1unitive Damages, 10 IDAHO L. Rav. 263 (1974); Haskell, The ireraft Manufacturer's
Liabiligfor Design and Punitive Damages, The Insurance Policy and the Public Policy, 40 J.
AIR. L. & COM. 595 (1972). Cf. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 452 (Wis.
1980) (the court found unpersuasive the argument that a defendant might avoid the deter-
rent effect of punitive damages by passing along punitive losses to consumers in the form of
increased prices).
78. Insurance for compensatory damages is commonly available. APPLEMAN, INSUR-
ANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4312 (1960).
79. See text accompanying note 92 infra.
80. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1981).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides that "[n]o person shall be... deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV provides that
"no state shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." The fundamental due process safeguard requires that legislation prohibiting or penal-izing conduct must sufficiently describe that proscribed conduct. The void-for-vagueness
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lack of standards by which the trier of fact can determine the appropri-
ate size of the award.8 2 As applied to punitive damages, the lack-of-
guidelines problem strikes at the heart of the issue of whether punitive
damages should be awarded at all.
83
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that due process
safeguards apply whenever the law deprives an individual of property
or liberty for engaging in unascertainable prohibited conduct. In
Giacco v. Pennsylvania,"' the Supreme Court considered a state statute
under which a defendant acquitted of a criminal charge could be as-
sessed court costs if the jury found his behavior "'reprehensible in
some respects,' 'improper,' or outrageous to 'morality and justice,'" al-
though not criminal beyond a reasonable doubt.85 The Supreme Court
struck down the statute for its failure to meet due process requirements
standard has been applied to non-criminal as well as criminal statutes. E.g., Amett v. Ken-
nedy, 416 U.S. 134, 158-59 (1974) (Lloyd-La-Follette Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7501, not overbroad or
vague; employee dismissal from Civil Service under § 7501 upheld); Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (partisan political activities allegedly violated state's merit
system act; Court rejected employees' argument that the act was unconstitutionally vague
because "political activities" were not sufficiently described); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S.
223, 229-32 (1951) (Court dismissed claim that immigration statute was unconstitutionally
vague because of phrase requiring deportation for undefined "crimes of moral turpitude").
Although the vagueness doctrine ordinarily tests the description of proscribed conduct,
courts have also applied the standard to the penalty prescribed in the statute. E.g., United
States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 495 (1948) (penalty under immigration statute for harboring
or concealing aliens held vague); United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1978),
rev'd, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) (inconsistent sentence terms under statutes making interstate ship-
ment of firearms a felony); Acunia v. United States, 404 F.2d 140, 143 (9th Cir. 1968) (stat-
ute lacking definition of incest and prescribed penalty unenforceable as to plaintiff); United
States v. Hairston, 437 F. Supp. 33, 35-36 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
82. E.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 826, 598 P.2d 452, 461, 157
Cal. Rptr. 482, 491 (1979) (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S.
912 (1980) (bad faith found in insurance company's failure to pay loss).
83. Justice Clark has claimed that there are no standards to determine when punitive
damage awards are justified. Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d at 902, 598 P.2d at 861,
157 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (Clark, J., dissenting). California's newly amended punitive damage
statute addressed this problem by incorporating the following definitions:
(1) "Malice" means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to
the plaintiff or conduct which is carried on by the defendant with conscious disre-
gard of the rights or safety of others.
(2) "Oppression" means subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in con-
scious disregard of that person's rights.
(3) "Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a
material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defend-
ant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing
injury.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(c) (West Supp. 1981).
84. 382 U.S. 399 (1965).
85. Id. at 404 (quoting Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 4 Serg. & Rawl. 127, 128 (Pa. 1818)
and Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 26 Pa. 171, 172 (1856)).
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because it was "so vague and standardless that it [left] the public uncer-
tain as to the conduct it prohibits [and left] judges and jurors free to
decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and
what is not in each particular case."86
A single manufacturer faced with the imposition of multiple puni-
tive damage verdicts should apply this reasoning to its own cases. By
asserting that the jury lacks guidelines by which to assess the economic
impact of a second or third punitive damage award, the defendant
might convince the judge to withhold determination of the exemplary
damage amount from the jury, if not to disallow punitive damages alto-
gether.87
The contention that the double jeopardy88 prohibition should pre-
vent the imposition of multiple punitive damage awards has not suc-
ceeded in mass-marketed product litigation. Double jeopardy
arguments have been posed when a defendant, punished for criminal
conduct, became subject to punitive damages in a civil case arising out
of the same misconduct.8 9 But double jeopardy protections have been
denied in such situations because "punitive damages in the plaintiff's
tort judgment, . . . allowable for the private wrong to the individual
rather than the accompanying wrong to the public, may effectively sup-
plement the criminal law in punishing the defendant." 90 Punitive dam-
ages are considered separate and apart from punishment for criminal
conduct. Thus, Richardson-Merrell's argument that, because it had
been fined by the FDA for false reporting,91 it would be subject to
double jeopardy by the imposition of punitive damages, came to no
avail in Toole. Relying on United States Supreme Court decisions, the
86. Id. at 402-03.
87. This position was argued in Memorandum, supra note 53, at 24. See also Maheu v.
Hughes Tool Co., 569 F.2d 459, 480 (9th Cir. 1978) (punitive damages not violative of con-
stitution in defamation suit).
88. U.S. Const. amend. V provides that "[n]o person shall be subject for the same of-
fense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .
89. In the early case of Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 28 Am. Rep. 582 (1898), the
defendant claimed that allowing punitive damages in a civil suit alleging assault and battery
placed him in double jeopardy by virtue of his prior criminal prosecution and fine. Indiana,
for example, prohibits punitive damages if a defendant is open to criminal prosecution for
the same act. This rule is rooted in Indiana common law beginning with Hudgson v. Taber,
5 Ind. 322 (1854). See generaly Ford, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, DEFENSE
RESEARCH IN STrrTUTE MONOGRA PH No. 15 (1969); Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases,
44 HARv. L. REv. 1173, 1196 (1931).
90. Morris v. MacNab, 25 N.J. 271, 281, 135 A.2d 657, 663 (1957) (plaintiff fraudulently
induced into bigamous marriage; $1,000 punitive damages awarded).




California appellate court ruled that the double jeopardy prohibition is
not applicable in "purely civil actions . . .[and] the award of penal
damages made under civil rules of procedure did not violate any con-
stitutional right of appellant."92
A New York appellate court in one of the last Richardson-Merrell
MER/29 cases has seemingly slammed the lid shut on the applicability
of double jeopardy in mass-marketed product litigation. In Ostopowitz
v. Richardson-Merrell,93 the plaintiff was awarded $850,000 in punitive
damages, subsequently reduced by the court to $100,000. Recognizing
that the defendant had been subjected to previous punitive damage
verdicts, the court addressed the double jeopardy issue. In the court's
view, "it was at least highly questionable that fifth amendment and ap-
plicable state constitution provisions, insofar as they prohibit multiple
jeopardy have any application to penalties imposed in civil actions." 94
Although the defendant was subject to repeated claims for punitive
damages in hundreds of product liability actions, no violation of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy occurred, according
to the court, because the identity of the plaintiff was different in each
case. The court reasoned that "if a person by a single act commits a
crime against two others he may be indicted and convicted for both
crimes. By parity of reasoning, defendants may not escape punitive
liability to one plaintiff because they have been held liable to an-
other." 95
Courts have refused to apply the double jeopardy prohibition in
the context of mass-marketed product litigation, apparently overlook-
ing the accepted quasi-criminal nature of punitive damage awards,
96
and the fact that such awards compensate the public at large. Punitive
damages are said to fulfill society's need to expose and punish manu-
facturing misconduct which affects consumers.97 Thus, the punitive
damage concept contains the criminal law standard that a crime com-
mitted against a member of society is a crime committed against society
as a whole.98 One proponent of punitive damages has suggested that
92. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 717, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (citing United States v. Regan, 232 U.S.
37 (1913), and United States v. Zucker, 101 U.S. 475 (1895)).
93. 157 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1967, at 21.
94. Id.
95. Id. (citation omitted).
96. The Supreme Court has stated that if the purpose of the law is punishment, the law
is penal Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 87 (1958).
97. See text accompanying notes 15 & 18 supra.
98. See, e.g., 21 AM. JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 577 (1971); People v. Gardner, 56 Cal.
App. 3d 91, 98, 128 Cal. Rptr. 101, 106 (1976), for discussions concerning the retributive
aspect of punishment for a criminal's harmful acts against society.
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the availability of punitive damages approximates criminal justice in
the civil arena. A civil plaintiff plays "private prosecutor," and is re-
warded by a "private fine" (in the form of punitive damages) for his
public service in bringing the wrongdoers to justice.99 Therefore,
where the criminal aspect of punitive damages is recognized, a multi-
plicity of punitive damage verdicts against the same defendant can vio-
late the double jeopardy principle that no man ought to be punished
twice for one offense. Multiple punitive damage awards against a sin-
gle manufacturer can "create a type of 'double jeopardy' whereby a
defendant can be financially ruined by successive. . punitive [dam-
age] verdicts."' "°°
Commerce clause10' protections may be unique to punitive dam-
ages in mass-marketed product litigation. The defense in a recent as-
bestos suit0 2 claimed that the California punitive damage statute"0 3
abridged the commerce clause in the event of many suits against a sin-
gle manufacturer and constituted an impermissible regulation of inter-
state commerce, because it allowed repetitive and uncontrolled
punishment for one course of conduct. The defense contended that
multiple and undue burdens on interstate commerce were created
which far outweighed ostensible local law benefits when a manufac-
turer could be subject to the punitive damage laws of other states. Var-
ious jurisdictions' punitive damage statutes would hinder a
manufacturer's ability to compete effectively in the stream of com-
merceYm4 Thus, the threat to free-flowing interstate commerce occurs
in the manufacturer's inability to formulate nationwide marketing deci-
sions when it cannot ascertain how often it will be subject to punitive
damage verdicts in products liability suits, or in what amounts. The
asbestos manufacturer suggested that a state may still protect the wel-
fare of its citizenry, but exert a lesser burden on a defendant manufac-
turer engaged in interstate commerce, by allowing the jury to consider
past and potential punitive damage awards when determining a ver-
dict.
99. Owen, supra note 11, at 1287-88.
100. Dubois, Punitive Damages in Personal Inury, Products Liability, and Professional
Malpractice Cases. Bonanza or Disaster, 43 INS. COUNSEL J. 344, 346 (1976).
101. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, provides that "the Congress shall have power.., to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." This grant has been interpreted as an exclusive Congressional power. Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
102. Memorandum, supra note 55.
103. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1981).
104. Memorandum, supra note 55.
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The eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment' °5 may also prevent the imposition of multiple punitive dam-
age awards. In a civil fraud case, Justice Frankfurter stated that a
"succession of separate trials for the enforcement of a great number of
criminal sanctions... might be a form of cruelty or oppression...
[and] the Constitution itself has guarded against such an attempt 'to
wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials'
... by prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments."' 0 6
3. Bankruptcy
The argument that many punitive damage awards might precipi-
tate a company's bankruptcy has found its most sympathetic reception
in Roginsky v. Jichardson-Merrell."7 There the court noted that the
side effects from the drug MER/29 had yielded at least seventy-five
cases filed in New York alone, with several hundred suits fied else-
where, and the other MER/29 litigation had resulted in $850,000 and
$500,000 in separate punitive verdicts.10 8 Judge Friendly appreciated
the impact that multiple punitive damage awards would have on the
defendant, stating that a "sufficiently egregious error as to one product
can end the business life of a concern that has wrought much good in
the past and might otherwise have continued to do so in the future
",109
Apart from raising the specter of a ruined defendant, the Roginsky
opinion recognized the "punitive overkill" concept. This idea has its
most anomalous effect where subsequent plaintiffs, each with valid ac-
tual damages, may be deprived of any recovery whatsoever from the
defendant, for the simple reason that previous punitive awards left the
defendant with no funds for paying other claims.
Some commentators have believed that the bankruptcy problem is
largely theoretical because very few single-product multiple litigation
cases result in punitive damage verdicts." 0 A recent case suggests
otherwise. In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., the jury recently awarded
125 million dollars in punitive damages against Ford.II Although the
105. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
106. 317 U.S. at 556 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (suit against electrical contractors for
collusive bidding).
107. 378 F.2d at 832.
108. Id. at 834 n.3.
109. Id. at 841.
110. Eg., Owen, supra note 11, at 1324-35.
111. No. 19-77-61 (Orange County Super. CL, Mar. 30, 1978).
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court subsequently reduced the award to 3.5 million dollars, it is clear
that several awards of this magnitude in addition to compensatory
damages could bankrupt a company." 2 The ramifications for smaller
business concerns are evident. A small company, whose conduct in
marketing a single defective product is eventually found "malicious" or
"in conscious disregard of the consumer's safety," could be financially
ruined by even one large punitive award; several such verdicts would
make bankruptcy certain. Multiple punitive awards can thus wreak
havoc in the business community, driving out small competitors who
cannot afford to pay such amounts. 1 3 One author has recognized that
if the bankruptcy of a manufacturer would result from imposing a sec-
ond or third verdict, punitive damages should not be available in addi-
tion to a compensatory award." 4 This suggestion, however, overlooks
the argument that one deserving plaintiff is no more entitled to recover
punitive damages than is another, and does not suggest whether the
judge or jury would determine if the pending award could push the
defendant over the edge.
C Judge or Jury-Fashioned Awards
The lack of control and management in awarding punitive dam-
ages exacerbates the problem of multiple exemplary verdicts. Tradi-
tionally, a punitive damage award lies in the discretion of the jury once
the plaintiff has shown that his injury resulted from fraud or reckless
disregard of safety on the defendant manufacturer's part. California
Civil Code section 3294 provides no guidelines as to the proper amount
of punishment." 5 The jury may set damages at any amount it deems
sufficient to punish and deter the defendant. The Model Uniform
Product Liability Act, set up by the United States Department of Com-
merce for use by the states, also retains the jury's customary function,
providing that the trier of fact may impose a punitive damage verdict if
the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that the harm
suffered resulted from the product seller's reckless disregard for the
112. See text accompanying note 138 infra for a discussion of the comparability of puni-
tive damage verdicts with a company's budget.
113. One writer arguing for the abolition of punitive damages in products liability cases
also recognized the problem of large punitive damages precipitating bankruptcy. In his
view, "elimination of small and moderate businesses imposes enormous costs upon society
via tax losses, increased welfare payments and dislocation of employees, The resultant anti-
competitive conditions caused by liquidating businesses will mean that only the big and
strong can survive." Hoenig, supra note 4, at 204.
114. Owen, supra note 11, at 1325.
115. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1981).
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safety of product users and others harmed by the product. 116
The only available rein on jury-determined multiple punitive
damage awards is the exercise of control by the trial court. 1 7 Punitive
damage awards may be reduced if the amount appears to have been
based on prejudice or partiality, or if the amount is so unreasonable as
to shock the conscience of the court.1 8 At the trial level, the judge may
be restricted to admonishing the jury, as was the trial judge in Rogin-
sky, to consider the "'potentially wide effect of the actions of the cor-
poration, and, on the other hand, . . . the potential number of actions
similar to this one to which that wide effect may render the defendant
subject.' "119
A jury instruction concerning the effect of proliferating punitive
damage awards might restrict the jury's propensity to impose excessive
amounts. 120 However, such instructions would probably do little to al-
leviate a jury's psychological reaction in cases where a punitive damage
claim is legitimate. Moreover, as Judge Friendly reasoned in Roginsky,
"it is hard to see what even the most intelligent jury would do with [an
instruction explaining the possibility of other awards], [the jury] being
inherently unable to know what punitive damages, if any, other juries
in other states may award other plaintiffs in actions yet untried."
121
The lack of guidelines by which the jury can determine the eco-
116. 44 Fed. Reg. 62714, 62748 (1979).
117. Eg., Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437, 457 (1980) (court
held that the potential for economically disastrous multiple punitive damage awards in
mass-disaster litigation can be avoided through judicial controls to ensure that the penalty
inflicted is not disproportionate to the harm done or contrary to the public interest).
118. Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), a f'd, 223 F.2d 429 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955); 22 AM. Jun. 2d Damages § 266 (1965).
119. Roginsky v. Richardson-MerrelU, 378 F.2d at 839. Judge Friendly noted that, in the
Ostopowitz case, the judge refused an instruction on the potential number of punitive
claims. Given the tenor of the Roginsky opinion, Friendly appears vaguely critical of the
Ostopowitz judge for eliminating the court's vestige of control over irrational jury actions.
Judge Friendly may have correctly perceived the sentiment of the jury, for the Ostopowitz
court was forced to reduce the $850,000 punitive award to $100,000, recognizing that if
every other jury in a case against this same manufacturer believed that it was to be
the final arbiters of the punishment, defendants could be destroyed by having other
assets parcelled out, in grotesquely disproportionate amounts among a number of
individuals who have already been fully compensated for their injuries. Perhaps
this would not be unconstitutional. It would be worse than that. It would be un-
wise.
157 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1967, at 21, col. 3.
120. The traditional instruction to a jury with respect to punitive damages is that the
amount to be awarded lies within the sound discretion of the trier of fact, as long as it is
exercised without passion or prejudice. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS BOOK OF AP-
PROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS (BAJI) No. 14.71 (1977 Revision).
121. 378 F.2d at 839.
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nomic impact of multiple punitive awards argues for only a threshhold
determination by the jury as to whether the evidence warrants a puni-
tive damage award. The United States Interagency Task Force on
Products Liability has recommended that the trial judge decide the
amount of punitive damages, while the jury merely determine whether
the defendant manufacturer engaged in sufficiently reckless or inten-
tional misconduct. 2 2 The Model Uniform Product Liability Act also
incorporates this concept, and outlines a number of factors for the trial
judge to consider."2'
Allowing the trial judge to determine the punitive damage amount
comports with the quasi-criminal nature of punitives. In criminal
cases, the jury never imposes a sentence upon the defendant whom it
convicts.'24 Thus, in a products case where punitive damages are to be
awarded against a defendant manufacturer, the judge, because of his
experience in sentencing, should impose the amount. Although he has
heard the same evidence as the jury, the judge may be less swayed psy-
chologically. He can balance the evidence with the awareness that the
defendant may have already paid punitive damages in other actions
involving the same product. Such a scenario would eliminate evidence
regarding the defendant's financial status from the actual damage
phase of the suit, evidence which might otherwise predispose a jury to
122. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY
VII-78-9 (1977).
123. The Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62714, 62748 (1979), pro-
vides as follows:
[B] If the trier of fact determines that punitives should be awarded, the court
shall determine the amount of those damages, in making this determination, the
court shall consider.
1. The likelihood that at the relevant time, serious harm would arise from the
product seller's misconduct;
2. e degree of the product seller's awareness of that likelihood;
3. The profitability of the misconduct to the seller;,
4. The duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it by the product
seller,
5. The attitude and conduct of the product seller upon discovery of the miscon-
duct and whether the conduct has been terminated;
6. The financial condition of the product seller,
7. The total effect of other punishment imposed or likely to be imposed on the
product seller as a result of the misconduct including punitive damage awards
to persons similarly situated to claimant and the severity of criminal penalties
to which the product seller has been or may be subjected;
8. Whether the harm suffered by the claimant was also the result of the claimant's
own disregard for personal safety.
Id. at 62748.
124. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12 (West 1970) provides in pertinent part that there is a "duty
upon the court authorized to pass sentence, to determine and impose the punishment pre-
scribed." See also People v. Navarro, 7 Cal. 3d 248, 497 P.2d 481, 102 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1972),
for a discussion of a judge's discretion in sentencing.
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make a higher compensatory damage award. 25 Where the judge deter-
mines the punitive damage award, a separate trial on the issue of puni-
tive damages becomes unnecessary. At present, in many cases, a
second jury considers the amount of punitive damages to be
awarded." 6 Moreover, the trial judge's decision, like the jury's, may
always be subject to appellate review if either party is dissatisfied.
2 7
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Even if the judge, rather than the jury, determines the amount of a
punitive damage award to be imposed against a defendant manufac-
turer, the problem remains that in mass-marketed product litigation in-
dividual plaintiffs each recover awards far in excess of their actual
damages. The fact that the manufacturer's reckless misconduct also
damages the consuming public cannot be reconciled with the fact that
punitive damage awards represent a windfall to individual plaintiffs. 28
125. In California, financial information is discoverable and admissible in punitive dam-
ages cases. Coy v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 210, 222-23, 373 P.2d 457, 463-64, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 393, 399 (1962); Cobb v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 543, 547-48, 160 Cal. Rptr.
561, 564 (1979).
126. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 1048(b) (Deering 1973) provides that "[t]he court, in fur-
therance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to
expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action... or of any
separate issue. . . ." Defendants may move to sever the punitive damage issues from the
compensatory damage phase of a products liability case in order to eliminate evidence com-
ing in of the manufacturer's "malicious" conduct and the manufacturer's net worth, which is
admissible on the issue of punitive damages. See note 125 supra. Such evidence might
predispose the jury to impose a higher compensatory award. California courts have ap-
proved this practice. In Stencel Aero Eng'r v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 3d 978, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 691 (1976), involving an aircraft accident, the court recognized the possibility of undue
prejudice to the defendant aircraft manufacturer where the claim for $ 10,000,000 in punitive
damages was connected to a $200 compensatory claim for property damage, and suggested
severing the punitive damages issues to protect against such prejudice. Id. at 988, 128 Cal.
Rptr. at 696. Punitives were not awarded in a separate trial on the issue of punitive damages
in the recent asbestos case of Beauregard v. Johns-Manville, No. C137466 (L.A. Super. Ct.,
June 6, 1980).
127. E.g., Finney v. Lockhart, 35 Cal. 2d 161, 164, 217 P.2d 19, 21 (1950). Amounts
awarded for punitive damages are not generally disturbed on appeal unless the sum appears
to be excessive or to have resulted from passion or prejudice. Brenner v. Haley, 185 Cal.
App. 2d 183, 188, 8 Cal. Rptr. 224, 227-28 (1960). A reviewing court considers the entire
record including the evidence to determine whether a punitive award is excessive as a matter
of law, when the award is greatly disproportionate to the defendant's net worth, Ferraro v.
Pacific Fin. Co., 8 Cal. App. 3d 339, 351, 87 Cal. Rptr. 226, 233 (1970), or when the award
does not approximate the actual harm suffered. Walker v. Signal Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 982,
997, 149 Cal. Rptr. 119, 126 (1978). These standards are applied when juries have deter-
mined an award, but presumably could be extended to cases where a trial judge imposes a
disproportionately high award.
128. The court in Wangen v. Ford Motor Co. acknowledged a "certain equitable ring" in
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It has been recognized that a punitive damage award from the defen-
dant constitutes unjust enrichment of the plaintiff and, unlike fines paid
to a public treasury for public use, similar "fines paid to private persons
will not be similarly used."'129 Continuing the punitive damage system
in mass-marketed product cases requires a solution which balances
each plaintiff's right to recover punitive damages with the right of de-
fendant manufacturers to be protected from financial ruin, 130 while
preserving the traditional deterrence/punishment elements of punitive
damages.
The lack of guidelines for judges and juries to follow when assess-
ing the economic impact of many punitive damage verdicts might re-
quire removing the determination of punitive damage awards from the
judicial forum. The formation of a regulatory agency to impose fines
when a defendant manufacturer recklessly disregards the consumer's
safety is a possible solution. A federal or state agency could be charged
with the responsibility of protecting consumers; millions of dollars are
already appropriated for similar purposes.131 Fines exacted which rea-
sonably relate to the amount of damage caused by a manufacturer's
defective product would maintain the traditional punitive damage stan-
dard, while a fine sufficiently publicized could mark the manufacturer
with the necessary public disapproval of his acts.
To date, government regulatory agencies policing manufacturers'
misconduct have proved ineffective. Problems in defining the requisite
improper conduct and in developing an agency's fact-finding procedure
to ferret out such misconduct often lead an agency to adopt the product
standards already worked out in an industry. 32 Moreover, limited dis-
ciplinary authority renders such agencies impotent. For example,
while the Federal Trade Commission was established to advocate the
public interest concerning commercial practices, 133 it cannot punish
wrongdoers or afford a remedy to injured private citizens. 134 It may
merely issue "cease and desist" orders which the corporation may ap-
Ford's argument that punitive damages should not be a windfall to those plaintiffs who win
the race to the courthouse. 294 N.W. 2d at 454.
129. Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d at 902, 598 P.2d at 860, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 700
(Clark, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 902-06, 598 P.2d at 860-63, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 700-03.
131. The Environmental Protection Agency, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1977), was estab-
lished pursuant to appropriations authorization, 42 U.S.C. § 4327 (1977).
132. STONE, supra note 17, at 96.
133. Davies v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 224 Il. App. 2d 141, 260 N.E. 2d 240 (1970) (dance
student sued under Federal Trade Commission Acts to recover money paid on contracts for
unused hours of dancing instruction).
134. Bartner v. Carter, 405 A.2d 194, 201 (Me. 1979) (footnotes omitted) (fraud action
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peal to the appellate courts within sixty days after the order has been
imposed.
135
Forming government agencies to police product misconduct, how-
ever, might cause legislative intervention in the traditional judicial do-
main.136 To maintain the courts' role in exacting punishment, it has
been suggested that in mass-marketed product cases all compensatory
claims should be litigated first. The measurement and assessment of
punitive damages would follow, with a single award against the de-
fendant manufacturer to be equitably distributed among the plain-
tiffs. 137 Under this sytem, a punitive damage award could be tailor-
made to fit the manufacturer's budget, so that the defendant would still
feel the "sting" but would not be threatened by bankruptcy. 38 Judge
Friendly advocated such a course, wishfully speculating that "[i]f there
were any way in which all cases could be assembled before a single
court... it might be possible for a jury to make one award to be held
for appropriate distribution among all successful plaintiffs, although
even as to this the difficulties are apparent."'
' 39
Judge Friendly's approach eliminates the unjust enrichment of in-
dividual plaintiffs, yet overlooks the need to punish on behalf of soci-
ety. The most attractive solution combines a single punitive damage
assessment with a reallocation of punitive damage payments away
from individual litigants. The United States Interagency Task Force
on Products Liability has suggested that punitive damage awards
should be paid to a source other than plaintiffs, such as a state fund
which could be employed for product liability victims who cannot ob-
brought against real estate brokers under state unfair practice acts comparable to Federal
Trade Commission provisions).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
136. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. F.T.C., 13 F.2d 673, 683 (8th
Cir. 1926) (Chamber of Commerce conducting grain market allegedly instigated misleading
publications and statements).
137. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 856-57 (D.C. Pa. 1974) (dictum).
138. STONE, supra note 17, at 102.
139. 378 F.2d at 839-40 n.l 1. Judge Friendly's speculation has recently become reality in
the case of In re N. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation, No.
C802213SW (N.D. Cal. 1980), where a nationwide class of plaintiffs will be certified to de-
termine whether punitive damages will be awarded against the manufacturer of the device.
The jury will determine for all parties whether to award punitive damages and, if so, in what
amount. Following separate litigation of the compensatory damage phase, the single puni-
tive damage award will be apportioned among all plaintiffs who have successfully estab-
lished that the IUD injured them. The court determined that the creation of the class was
necessary to preserve the manufacturer's ability to pay claims. See text accompanying notes
104-14 supra. In a conversation with this author, an attorney for some of the plaintiffs indi-
cated that the class certification order will be-appealed on constitutional and jurisdictional
grounds.
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tain recovery. 4° This solution would eliminate the faults and preserve
the best aspects of the punitive damage system as applied to mass-mar-
keted product litigation. The manufacturer would still pay for his mis-
conduct, and society would still be compensated, but no single plaintiff
could recover a windfall at the expense of subsequent litigants, or at the
cost of financially destroying the manufacturing concern.
V. CONCLUSION
Where products defective in their manufacture or design result
from a manufacturer's conscious or reckless disregard of the consum-
ers' safety, punitive damages are often sought in products liability
cases. In mass-marketed product litigation, plaintiffs must convince the
trial court that multiple punitive awards against a single manufacturer
are warranted. Prior knowledge of a defect accompanied by a failure
to rectify it, or fraudulent misrepresentations of a product's safety, may
prove sufficient manufacturing misconduct to justify imposing multiple
punitive damage awards. Collateral estoppel may ease subsequent
plaintiffs' burden of proof, in the event a manufacturer has engaged in
such reprehensible conduct with respect to all lots of the product. Mul-
tiple verdicts may be justified to compensate plaintiffs for litigation ex-
penses, or to remind the manufacturer that the public continues to
disapprove of his misconduct.
Defendants have traditionally opposed the imposition of punitive
damages in products liability suits, insisting that such cases should fo-
cus on the product, rather than on the manufacturer. The punishment
and deterrent effects fade with the imposition of many punitive damage
awards, whereas several large actual damage verdicts along with ac-
companying costs of suit may prove to be a sufficient deterrent.
140. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY
VII-78-9 (1977). This fund could be used to compensate victims when recovery would be
precluded by the defendant's insolvency or when claims would be barred by statutes of
limitations. But the trial court in In re Paris Air Crash, 427 F. Supp. 701 (C.D. Cal. 1977),
overruled on other grounds, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1980), said:
California has ... spoken..., in unequivocal language in CC § 3294 permitting
punitive damages, without limitation in tort cases for the purpose of punishing and
deterring tortious conduct ....
Punitive damages are addressed... to the nature and gravity of the invasion of
piaintif's right. They are meant to guarantee that such conduct on the part of a
tortfeasor will not be repeated against this plaintiff.
Id. at 705, 706 (emphasis in original). The case of Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d
at 454, followed similar reasoning. The Wangen court noted that proposals which advocated
the turning of punitive damage awards over to the public treasury ignore the fact that such




Defendants' constitutional objections involving due process and
double jeopardy have failed in mass-marketed product litigation. The
California punitive damage statute has withstood "void-for-vagueness"
challenges and the double jeopardy prohibition extends only to crimi-
nal prosecutions. Whether multiple punitive damage verdicts amount
to cruel and unusual punishment or transgress the commerce clause
remains to be tested in future cases. The manufacturer's imminent
bankruptcy may prove the most compelling reason for declining to im-
pose multiple punitive awards.
Judges and juries may find the management and control of puni-
tive damages in mass-marketed product litigation increasingly difficult
in light of recent product liability developments. For example, Califor-
nia has adopted the "industry-wide" liability theory, under which a
plaintiff may sue all manufacturers producing a generic product. 141 In
the event punitive damages are appropriate, assessment procedures in
the first such suit, much less in subsequent suits, appear incapable of
accurate determination. Further, the recent discovery of toxic shock
syndrome in tampon users promises many suits brought by victims who
are certain to seek punitive damages against the manufacturers. 42
When the burdens of proving the validity or invalidity of multiple
punitive damage claims become too great, perhaps litigants and courts
alike will look to the legislatures for a solution that will allow public
sanctions against the manufacturing industry while at the same time
allowing for protection of the production process.
Laura Greenberg
141. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1980). The California Supreme Court held that, in the absence of proof that the manufac-
turer was not making the product at the time the plaintiff was injured by it, each manufac-
turer's liability will be apportioned according to its market share of the product. Id. at 612,
607 P.2d at 942, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
142. Plaintiff Linda Imboden has sued Proctor and Gamble, Inc., for $5 million in puni-
tive damages, alleging that the manufacturer knew its tampon product was hazardous.
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 1980, at 84.
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